Freud's psychology involves a search for meaning in the apparently meaningless. 3 principles govern the search: the principle of the dynamic unconscious, that the effects of behavior alter only its conscious (and preconscious), not its unconscious sources; the principle of the plasticity of the interpersonal drives, that sex and aggression are psychically elaborated because they can and must be socialized; and the principle of mastery through reversal of voice, that one must do what one has suffered. These principles account for major aspects of normal development, pathology, and therapy according to classical psychoanalytic writings. Freud's cathexis theory is an alternative, less parsimonious account of some of the same phenomena. That an impulse can precipitate its own control can be accounted for without postulating countercathexis or bound cathexis.
Psychoanalysis as a scientific system has appealed to many persons, including those outside psychiatry and psychology, because of its beauty and elegance as a theory. The elegance lies in Freud's discovery that a few simple principles can account for the most varied and seemingly senseless behaviors: dreams, mistakes, jokes, hypnosis, and symptoms. Psychoanalytic therapy occupies itself with finding meanings in such apparently meaningless behaviors; yet when psychoanalysts attempt to formulate their ideas systematically, they abandon this enterprise and assume the airs and graces of scientists, talking about energies, forces, cathexes, systems, layers: mechanical and physical analogues rather than meanings. Fisher (1963) has strongly urged the possibility that the two enterprises, the explanation of behaviors in terms of meanings, central to psychoanalysis as therapy, and the physical analogies, are logically incompatible. He points out that the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams embodies the mechanical approach, contrasted with the search for meanings of the first six chapters. Rapaport (1960b, p. 102) spoke of the same seventh chapter as being the core of the psychoanalytic system, along with Freud's papers on metapsychology, and deplored their neglect by psychoanalysts.
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In the present essay the enterprise of deciphering meanings will be referred to as Freud's psychology. Discussion of the mental apparatus in terms of a quasithermodynamic psychic energy and other physical analogies originating in the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams is often referred to as Freud's metapsychology, but philosophers object to this usage as imprecise. The term metapsychology will therefore be avoided and reference made rather to theory of cathexis, reductionistic theory, or similar expressions. For purposes of clarifying psychoanalytic psychology one need not prove that the Freudian cathexis theory is logically incompatible with the psychology, much less need it be in any way intrinsically wrong or faulty. That it is irrelevant suffices. In addition to Fisher, philosophers who have argued that meaning, wish, and similar notions are the central concepts of psychoanalysis are Fingarette (1963) , Flew (1956) , and E. B. Holt (1915) , who warned against the concept of psychic energy. Freud himself was an enthusiastic and extravagant theorist at all levels, including the physiological reductionistic, though whether he took his cathexis theory as seriously as his psychology is questionable. Erikson (1950, pp. 59-60) apparently thinks not and finds cathexis dispensable.
Although the concept of mental energy apparently remains in good standing with most contemporary psychoanalytic theorists, the most extreme of Freud's excursions into biological theorizing, for example into the death 432 instinct, are not widely accepted by his current followers. But in giving up these putative errors, they have retired to a version of Freud's reductionism at times singularly poor in content. Hartmann's (1939) assertion that psychoanalysis is biological seems empty. What else can living organisms be but biological? And what kind of biologist studies his subjects merely by talking with them? Rapaport's exegesis of drive reduction, often in terms of the suckling infant, also verges on the vapid. What else can a drive do but seek its own satisfaction? Referring to the reflex arc as the basic unit of behavior is passe everywhere but among some psychoanalytic theorists. Drive reduction as a basic principle of behavior accounts for the behavior of suckling infants and rats better than it does that of adults or older children, potential candidates for psychoanalysis as therapy. Moreover, drive reduction is as congenial to many antianalytic psychologies as it is to psychoanalysis.
The objections to these aspects of current systematic versions of psychoanalysis may be summarized, somewhat redundantly, as follows: (a) they are not distinctively human in reference; (b) they are not distinctively psychoanalytic; (c) they are reductionistic, sometimes in outmoded terms; (d) at times they verge on tautology; (e) they neglect some of the keys of therapy, which unlock meanings.
For many years there was another objection, which no longer is valid, though it gave rise to many dissident schools in the meantime. This objection was that the psychoanalytic system neglected positive and constructive forces of growth. Hartmann, in collaboration with Kris and Loewenstein, has been working to encompass normal ego development within the scope of psychoanalysis. He did not of course discover the conflict-free ego functions, since academic psychologists had always been all too exclusively concerned with them. What Hartmann and his collaborators have done is to give ego functions a local habitation and a name within systematic psychoanalysis. There are dreams and symptoms, and there are ego functions of primary autonomy, and there are ego functions of secondary autonomy. This is an achievement, but not an integration of ego psychology into psychoanalysis. Rather, it is what the Gestalt psychologists called an "Und-Verbindung." Truly to integrate ego development into psychoanalytic theory requires that the same few principles that explain dreams, slips, jokes, symptoms, hypnosis, transference, etc., shall also explain the normal and benign course of development. Erikson's work comes closer to this ideal, but it does not constitute an explicit system. Fenichel (1937) strove to integrate ego development with other aspects of psychoanalytic psychology under the hegemony of instincts and tension reduction. Hendrick (1942) postulated a new "instinct to master," and White (1963) postulated "independent ego energies." Thus there is a cleavage between Fenichel and others who maintain that classical psychoanalysis can account for observations on ego development newly brought into psychoanalytic focus, and Hendrick, White, Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein and their followers who have postulated new principles for the new observations. The present essay is closer to Fenichel in asserting that ego development requires for its account no new principles, but closer to Hendrick and White in the conception of ego development.
One of the weak points in the received system of psychoanalysis, and a pivotal point of the present essay, lies in the difficulties with the term cathexis. Holt (1962) found 14 distinct and not altogether compatible uses of the term cathexis in Freud's writings. Hilgard stated that cathexis is "a very obscure idea [1962, p. 482n.] .» Lashley (Lashley Si Colby, 1957 ) maintained that there is no universe of discourse in which "psychic energy" is a meaningful term, and that since it is the central concept in psychoanalytic theory, all of psychoanalytic theory is scientific nonsense. White (1963) , pursuing a different line of thought, has asked what it is that bound and free cathexis, cathexis and countercathexis have in common to merit a common name. He postulates a new motive, or ego energy, which he calls effectance, to accomplish what was left to bound cathexis and countercathexis in the Freudian system. While his critique of current psychoanalytic theory can serve pres-ent purposes as well as his own, his proposed solution is in more direct contradiction to the present one than is the received system. For cathexes, bound, free, hyper-, or counter-, are drained of psychological meaning, hence belong to a different universe of discourse than what is here called psychoanalytic psychology. Effectance, a sense of effectiveness, contains intelligible meaning, hence belongs within our chosen universe of discourse. The phenomena covered by effectance will be shown encompassed by traditional principles of psychoanalytic psychology. In particular, there is a clear psychological meaning to the assertion that an impulse does in the normal course of events often lead to or precipitate its own control, without invocation of any (nonpsychological) concept of energy.
The purpose of the present essay is to demonstrate three principles, or perhaps areas, of psychoanalytic psychology. These principles are distinctively if not quite exclusively human and distinctively if not quite exclusively psychoanalytic. Major aspects of ego development can be accounted for by the principles as well as the traditional subject matter of psychoanalysis (here following Fenichel). They are all found, explicitly or implicitly, in the writings of Fenichel, Rapaport, and many others, but originally in the writings of Freud. They are not reducible to or derivable from biological or tension-reduction or pleasure principles (here following Hendrick and White). While precise formulation of the principles is not easy, one can say where they are to be looked for. The three areas are those of the dynamic unconscious, the plasticity of the interpersonal drives, and mastery of experience through reversal of voice. The question to be raised is: Are any other major dynamic principles necessary? Are additional concepts and principles ad hoc and supernumerary?
Psychoanalytic ideas by themselves cannot suffice to account for psychological observations but must be supplemented by ordinary terms and observations from the common domain. That a drive seeks gratification is such a notion from the common domain, as is also the observation that any gratification, once tasted, is reluctantly surrendered. (Freud, 1900b, p. 60S) , 2 but that is too weak a formulation. That the most important determinants of behavior are unconscious is too strong, though it was once popularly believed to be the psychoanalytic view. One version might be that a given idea influences behavior more strongly when it is unconscious than after it is made conscious. The most elegant version, though it must be qualified to make it strictly true, states: Both conscious and unconscious ideas affect behavior, but the consequences of behavior affect only its conscious sources. In this formulation preconscious ideas are obviously grouped with conscious ones.
Not encompassed in the principle are the appearance in consciousness of derivatives of the unconscious, the institution of censorship, and other complications. If this version held exactly, therapy would be impossible. The principle is a schematic version of the shortrun relation of conscious and unconscious determinants to behavior. Behavior originating in the unconscious is not stamped out by ordinary rewards or consequences; hence, this is the Law of No Effect.
PLASTICITY OF THE INTERPERSONAL DRIVES
The second principle can be stated that those drives that normally take other people as their object, that is, the sexual and aggressive drives, can be satisfied by a wide variety of acts as well as objects. Although psychoanalysts now generally agree that the drives for their study are the sexual and aggressive ones, they are not always clear why it is these needs rather than such imperative and instinctual drives as thirst, oxygen need, and sleep. The latter drives do not necessarily or normally express themselves in relation to other people, they are resistant to delay, and they do not permit substitution to any extent. The importance for psychoanalytic psychology of sex and aggression results from their plasticity and their interpersonal character together. The interpersonal nature of the impulses demands their socialization; their plasticity makes it possible. The plasticity and the socializing pressures together lead to psychic elaboration. Socializing pressures at times take the form of taboo. There is thus an integral, logical reason for psychoanalytic psychology to concern itself with the sexual and aggressive drives, precisely the ones around which there are taboos. They are not the only drives, nor the most life-important ones, but they are the social ones and the psychically elaborated ones. The principle must be broadened slightly to cover the fact that in infancy, for obvious reasons, the baby takes his own person as object, or more properly, the baby and the object-person(s) are undifferentiated at first. The sex drives are manifold and physiological in origin, hence arise out of the range of psychology proper. Although the biological origins of the sex drive are consistent with this formulation, though outside its scope, there is an alternative way of thinking of the pregenital phases of psychosexual development, to wit, as the sexualization and aggressivization of relatively nonplastic drives, such as hunger and defecation. The most imperative drive, the need for oxygen, seems to be least often sexualized. Rapaport (1960b, p. 47, p. 129) speculated that emphasis on the sex drives was not necessarily a permanent feature of psychoanalysis as a system, a view Freud did not share. The present formulation supports the orthodox emphasis.
Freud's early psychological writings are cast in the format of the plasticity principle: dreams, slips, jokes, and symptoms are disguised expressions of unconscious or suppressed wishes (though jokes are closely related to play, a subject he treated at length some years later). The term wish is entirely within the domain of psychology, that is, of meaning, but in the reductionistic fervor of later years it passed from the technical vocabulary, being replaced by the ambiguously biological terms instinct, drive, and instinctual drive. Current usage permits substitution of impulse, which will be used where possible as a compromise between (the biological or pseudobiological) drive and (the truly psychological) wish.
The ontogeny of sexual drives constitutes one of the major observational findings of psychoanalysis. Although it has been stated (Waelder, 1960) that the aggressive drive undergoes no similar developmental transformation, perhaps a slight shift of focus will reveal ego development as the analogue within the sphere of aggression, broadly conceived, of psychosexual development within the sphere of libido.
MASTERY THROUGH REVERSAL OF VOICE
The third principle, which may be called the principle of the converse consequence, states that experience is mastered by repeating in an active role what one has previously experienced in a passive role: one must do what one has suffered. What alter has done to ego, ego must do to alter. But thanks to the plasticity of drives, I need not necessarily do to you exactly what you have done to me, nor need the object of my actions be the same person who has done something to me. In infancy and early childhood one may assume a large measure of substitutability of people and animals, animate and inanimate objects, nor is this propensity for substituting new objects ever lost.
The principle of the converse consequence obviously has a driven, a drive-like quality; hence, the principle of drive plasticity is used to account for its vicissitudes. While the sex drive is of biological origin, the aggressive impulse is more obscure in origin. An enormous simplification is achieved by putting the principle of the converse consequence as a solution to the conundrum of the origin of the aggressive drive. Everyone begins life in a helpless and passive position. Each step of growth in the direction of active mastery precipitates one into new experiences that must in turn be mastered. This principle alone thus can account for a bottomless reservoir of need for mastery. The need for mastery can be thought of as identical with the aggressive drive if one interprets aggression broadly to include exploration, play, and other aspects of what White calls effectance. If the term aggression is limited to hostility, then aggressive impulses are only part of what is included in this principle, but the principle still includes all of what has been called the aggressive drive.
Freud's clearest exposition of the principle of the converse consequence is in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, first published in 1920. Children's play is given as an example of phenomena requiring for their account the pleasure principle but also an "instinct for mastery [Freud, 1920, p. 16] ." In throwing away his toys, playing "gone" with them, the child mastered by repeating in an active part what he had experienced passively when his mother left him periodically; the game also expressed his impulse to revenge himself on his mother for leaving him. Similarly, when children suffer indignities at the hands of physicians and dentists, they soon subject a playmate to a version of the experience, again mastering by changing from passive to active role, revenging themselves on a substitute, and also expressing "a wish that dominates them the whole time-the wish to be grown-up and to be able to do what grown-up people do [Freud, 1920, p. 17] ." Apparently Freud meant that mastery through reversal of voice and the pleasure principle, expressed in terms of the wish to be grown-up and the wish for revenge, are partially competing explanations, but that both are required to account for play.
To speak of a child's wishes to be grown-up and to take revenge is to reveal the vacuity of the pleasure principle. The operative principles are those that account for the origin of such wishes, not for the fact that they seek gratification, which says no more than that they exist. Are both these wishes not expressions of desire for mastery through changing from a passive to an active role? If so, the two interpretations, that in terms of pleasure principle and that in terms of reversal of voice, reduce to aspects of a single one; the impulse to master operates like a drive and seeks gratification in many alternative ways.
Beyond the Pleasure Principle is commonly stated to be the source of what is here called the principle of the converse consequence, but that statement is not accurate. The principle was part of psychoanalytic thinking from the beginning. In The Interpretation of Dreams there are a number of references to reversal of voice as a principle of disguise. More germane to the present topic, Freud explained one of his dreams saying, "Turning the tables on His Excellency with a vengeance! He had refused to appoint me professor extraordinarius and I had retaliated in the dream by stepping into his shoes [Freud, 1900a, p. 193] ." "Turning the tables" is a nice paraphrase of the converse consequence; "turning the tables with a vengeance" expresses the frequent but not invariable association of this principle with hostile aggressive impulses.
In Civilization and its Discontents Freud (1930) reaffirmed the primitive and instinctual nature of the aggressive drive and added that the institution of conscience derives entirely from transformation of the aggressive drive rather than from libido (hence the above statement that ego development is to the aggressive drive what psychosexual development is to libido). The development of conscience is a central problem in the institution of culture. Omitting Freud's speculations about murder of the primal father, his account of the origins of conscience and of a sense of guilt is as follows.
The child is restrained in expression of his impulses by external authority (Freud's insistence that it be the father is long ago and far away). The child wishes to take vengeance on his parent for imposing restraint, but this is not permitted; besides, it would endanger the parent's love, which he needs. He therefore masters this situation by taking the vengeance on a part of himself, namely, the errant impulses, that he would like to have taken on the parent. Moreover, by means of identification he assumes the role of the parent, treating part of himself, that is, his impulses, as his parent treated him or them. By both of these means he establishes control of his impulses. The former particularly accounts for the observation that the child may be much harsher with himself than his parents would have him. The child thus reproduces within himself the relation of obedience to authority, as a means of mastering an otherwise frustrating situation. The internalized authority is the superego, which watches over the ego as the parent watched over the child.
Returning now to the principle of the converse consequence, what he has done to me I must do to him, remembering that Freud wrote German, and making use of the possibility of substituting a victim for our vengeance, we have: What he (er) has done to me (mick), I (ich) must do to it (es). (A grammatical lapse must be permitted in German to make a point.) Translating back into English, substituting "parent" for "he," we have: What my parent has done to me, my ego must do to my id.
This formulation differs in this much from that of Civilization and its Discontents. Freud speaks of the superego as exercising authority over the ego, whereas our version depicts ego as controlling id, that is, impulse. In phenomenological terms these descriptions are not entirely different. In either case the child has become internally differentiated using an interpersonal relation both as model and as impetus. To the extent that the differentiation of ego from impulse is something other than the differentiation of superego from ego, they are successive stages in the formation of conscience, indeed, in the development of the ego. In any case, Freud's account is compatible with explanation by successive applications of the principle of the converse consequence.
There must be some stage at which the child experiences his impulses as controlling him. Again, this experience can be mastered by his ego controlling his impulses as it has been controlled by them. This is another and coordinate version of how the principle of mastery through reversal of voice accounts for an impulse being enlisted in its own control.
But at this point we have solved, or proposed a solution to, one of the most baffling theoretical problems of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic theorists from Freud and Breuer on have approached the problem of how an impulse contributes to its own control by postulating as new entities bound cathexis and countercathexis, sometimes also hypercathexis. But why is cathexis bound? How does cathexis become transformed to countercathexis? The principles were already at hand without multiplying new constructs. One is controlled, simultaneously or in turn, by one's impulses and one's parents, and one therefore needs to control something in return, if not one's parents, then one's impulses.
In some formulations identification is invoked to explain this process. But is identification an explanation? Or, rather, does the principle of the converse consequence have identification as one of its manifestations? The latter would seem to be the simpler version. At this point an additional principle has been assumed, namely, that experiences create structures, that is, permanent or semipermanent changes in the person. What one does becomes what one is. This assumption must be made in psychoanalytic theory, but it is a general psychological principle, part of the common domain, rather than a specifically psychoanalytic principle. How else would learning of any sort be possible?
Another classical monograph that continues the line of thought of Beyond the Pleasure Principle is Anna Freud's (1936) 
essay on
The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence. One of the best known and most influential concepts of this monograph is her exposition of the mechanism of identification with the aggressor, which she conceives of as a way station in the development of the superego, a precursor of and substitute for guilt feelings. True morality requires not only taking over the adult's criticism but turning it into selfcriticism. The underlying dynamic principle, she makes clear, is the change from passive to active as a means of assimilating unpleasant or traumatic episodes. Another defense mechanism, that of "altruistic surrender," common in parents and in some other persons, she also explains in terms of the principle of mastery through reversal of voice.
Let us recapitulate briefly. One masters reality by turning the tables, by actively repeating what one has passively experienced. Since this principle governs the relation to reality, it is a core of the ego's functioning. But it is also a governing principle in the most essential stages of the formation and development of the ego, namely, the initial separation of ego from impulse, the identification with the aggressor, or, more broadly, with authority, and the internalization of the dictates of authority in the form of conscience and self-criticism. If one conceives of altruism as a still further stage of ego development, it becomes further evidence that ego development proceeds by application of the principle of the converse consequence (hence, using hyperbole, by transformation of the "aggressive drive").
Clearly, the proposed three principles account for much of normal ego functioning and of ego development. Adequately to represent psychoneurosis, which is due to inner conflict, one must allow for a short circuit in the elaboration of interpersonal impulses. Socialization, the pressure for deformation of the impulse, must arise within the individual himself. How that happens, how the interpersonal clash becomes the model and the occasion for an intrapersonal clash in the normal course of ego development, has just been described as a consequence of the principles already assumed. The extraanalytic assumption of structuralization permits us to accommodate the fact that ego mediates both the socializing impress of the environment-and at just this point inner conflict, hence neurosis, becomes possible-and also the motility by means of which impulses attain their objects.
ANXIETY AND SEXUAL CONFLICT A mature version of one aspect of Freud's views on pathology can be found in Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) . "The situation [an infant] regards as a 'danger' and against which it wants to be safeguarded is that of non-satisfaction, of a growing tension due to need, against which it is helpless [Freud, 1926, p. 137] ." The infant comes to fear loss of mother-since he does not know of the permanence of objects, her temporary disappearance is experienced as loss-in advance of being overcome by excess stimulation. "This change constitutes a first great step forward in the provision made by the infant for its self-preservation, and at the same time represents a transition from the automatic and involuntary fresh appearance of anxiety to the intentional reproduction of anxiety as a signal of danger [Freud, 1926, p. 138] ."
Let us call a situation of helplessness of this kind that has been actually experienced a traumatic situation. ... A danger-situation is a recognized, remembered, expected situation of helplessness. Anxiety is the original reaction to helplessness in the trauma and is reproduced later on in the dangersituation as a signal for help. The ego, which experienced the trauma passively, now repeats it actively in a weakened version, in the hope of being able itself to direct its course [Freud, 1926, pp. 166-167] .
The later situations are most characteristically loss of mother, loss of parent's love, castration, and punishment from the superego. Freud traces briefly how each of these types of anxiety reproduces and represents a transformation of the original anxiety, in each case containing some element of helplessness in the face of mounting tension.
A modern analogy may add to and clarify an aspect of this exposition. One may think of the baby's experience as a message sent and his consequent actions as the corresponding message received. The transition from the passive to the active voice is in this analogy the channel of communication. The helplessness of the traumatic situation thus corresponds to an overloading of the channel of communication, so that no message can be sent. To put it simply, the baby cannot express all that he feels. What he cannot express constitutes the trauma and is repressed. Apparently there is here some prototype of repression, even prior to the differentiation of an ego. This residue of unassimilated experience thus becomes part of the unconscious, and, in accord with the first principle, forever sends messages to behavior without receiving a message in return.
Freud's discussion of the castration complex as growing directly out of the infant's fear of helplessness in the face of mounting tension offers a bridge from the principle of mastery through reversal of voice to problems of the evolution of sexual impulses, that is, psychosexual development. The attempt to explain the difficulties of female sexuality in terms of the need to shift the object of affection from mother to father is not convincing on Freud's own logic. For the first caretaker must be a withholder as well as a giver and hence is inevitably an object of ambivalence. A priori, shifting love to father might as well be a simplification of the girl's libidinal life as a complication (Freud, 1931) . Much clearer is that the need to shift from one organ, the clitoris, to another, the vagina, offers an obstacle to the girl's harmonious development. But if the little girl fails to discover (as Freud believed) or only dimly perceives her vagina, how much more dimly must she perceive the possibility of gratifying discharge of sexual tension in the passivereceptive role. At the same time, the traumatic possibilities of helplessness in the face of tension are all too well known. Hence the impulse to master through activity, which governs the girl's ego functioning and development as much as the boy's, is in fixed opposition to her ultimately harmonious and gratifying sexual position. Here is a clear paradox in female sexuality, necessarily in force in childhood and never completely obsolete.
A boy's sexual development is simpler through being spared this paradox, but he experiences his own typical dangers. The ego is differentiated out of a primal unity, not only an ego-id matrix but also an ego-reality matrix (Loewald, 1951) . Boundaries of self and of objects must necessarily be established simultaneously. This first stage of primitive unity and immediate gratification has been described both in terms of the infant feeling helpless and feeling omnipotent; yet these descriptions are not contradictory. Although one can hardly expect to describe the state with words, the infant may be said to be omnipotent in participating in the omnipotence of his environment, but impotent to the extent he is differentiated from it. The attraction of the passive-receptive gratification of the primal unity is hazardous to a girl's ego as well as to a boy's, since it implies not only helplessness but a threat of ego dissolution. On the whole, however, a girl can integrate remnants of this period into her later life, social as well as sexual, more easily than can a boy. The inevitable occurrence of the passive role or position in nonsexual sectors of life may become inordinately threatening to him. The bearers of the most modest authority, male or female, may become potential symbolic mutilators. Thus the high school boy may be disturbed by the requirement to do his homework, attend school regularly, or abide by ordinary family rules. The very concordance of his ego needs and his sexual drives may make a threat to one doubly intolerable. White (1963) has criticized the received psychoanalytic version of ego development. A great simplification is achieved, he asserts, by postulating, in addition to the sexual and aggressive drives, independent ego energies that account for play, exploration, competence, reality testing, and other phenomena; this phenomenological view is simpler, more convincing, less tortured than the patchwork of drive-derivative accounts of ego development, invoking cathexis, anticathexis, bound cathexis, hypercathexis, neutralization and deneutralization, fusion and defusion of drives. Had he been more meticulous to couch his proposal entirely in psychological terms, avoiding all reductionistic ones like energy (as he might have without changing his argument in any essential), the difference between his view and the present one would be small, though not negligible.
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM
The principle of the converse consequence has been shown in its favorable and benign operation to be the chief or perhaps the entire source and nature of what White calls independent ego energies, that is, of the impulses toward effectiveness and competence, as distinct from drives characterized by tension reduction, but it is also the origin of the aggressive impulses. The present form is simpler than White's version. He does not cope with the paradox that aggression has the quality of a drive though lacking the organic base of sex and other drives. He also avoids coping with the similarity of positive (effectance) and negative (hostile) aspects of aggression. On the other hand, the present version leaves one with the necessity to account for their difference. That both are aspects of what Hendrick termed the "instinct to master" does not lessen the need to account for the difference. At this point it appears one must have recourse to quantitative considerations. Where the child's experience is such that he can express his reaction to it adequately, where he can cope, abreact, or discharge, as one will, then he can play, explore, and acquire competence. Where the intensity of his experience or the limited possibility of reaction leaves the child as a channel of communication taxed or overwhelmed, he will range from anger to rage, from anxiety to repression and other pathological phenomena.
In psychoanalytic writings quantitative considerations are usually termed the economic view. The economic view serves two quite different functions, on the one hand being the essence of Freudian reductionism, on the other serving to replace a monistic principle of human functioning. Freud often expressed the view that with true scientific understanding, the qualitative or meaningful descriptions would be replaced by purely quantitative ones. But what happened was in at least one instance exactly the opposite:
At one time I attached some importance to the view that what was used as a discharge of anxiety was the cathexis which had been withdrawn in the process of repression. To-day this seems to me of scarcely any interest. The reason for this is that whereas I formerly believed that anxiety invariably arose automatically by an economic process, my present conception of anxiety as a signal given by the ego in order to affect the pleasure-unpleasure agency does away with the necessity of considering the economic factor. Of course there is nothing to be said against the idea that it is precisely the energy that has been liberated by being withdrawn through repression which is used by the ego to arouse the affect; but it is no longer of any importance which portion of energy is employed for this purpose [Freud, 1926, p. 140], In other words, when anxiety was understood as a signal, that is, as meaningful, the economic version was no longer of interest, exactly the reverse of the sequence anticipated by programmatic reductionism (which Freud nonetheless continued to advocate).
Even for those who disavow reductionism, who wish to remain psychologists concerned with meaningful units of behavior, the quantitative view cannot be ignored. Goldstein (1939) asserts that there must be just one principle of human conduct, for if there are two principles then there must be a superordinate principle to decide which one is in force at any moment, and it will be the superordinate principle that then becomes the one principle. For him this superordinate principle is self-actualization. Psychoanalysis does not uphold any such single principle to account for behavior. Rather, of the several forces brought to bear at any one time, it is their quantitative relations or, as Waelder (1960) phrases it, the parallelogram of forces, that must decide the outcome. At the present time virtually nothing has been accomplished by way of independent measurement of quantitative factors. Hence they invariably have been inferred from the outcome. We may conclude that while a quantitative assumption is needed to avoid the logic of a monistic psychology, its sole function is to ratify the observations. The quantitative assumption covers what we do not understand, and it loses interest as fast as we understand meanings. SOME IMPLICATIONS The principle of mastery through reversal of voice has been invoked by psychoanalysts beginning with Freud in a wide variety of contexts; yet Rapaport, who was thoroughly familiar with it (Rapaport, 1953) , failed to include it in his systematization of psychoanalysis (Rapaport, 1960b) or in his exposition of psychoanalysis as a developmental psychology (Rapaport, 1960a) . On the other hand, Hendrick (1942) , who drew attention to the central importance of the "instinct to master," failed to state its specifically psychoanalytic version, that mastery is achieved by reversal of voice. The latter criticism applies also to White's (1963) "independent ego energies." In Erikson's (19SO, ch. 6) writings, particularly in those concerning the autocosmic sphere, the microsphere, and the macrosphere, the principle is given its due as central to psychoanalytic thinking.
At least some people in some aspects of their lives arrive at a state where the principle is greatly modulated; they can stop fighting without striking the last blow. On the other hand, many adults do not outgrow the crude manifestations of the principle. The theory of ego development abstracted here from the writings of Freud and Anna Freud can be restated in terms and in a style of thought borrowed from Piaget. Interpersonal schemas serve as models for intrapersonal schemas, with frustration of (ordinarily) interpersonal impulses as impetus. Loewald (1960) specifically describes ego development in such terms, in a paper applying the same paradigm to psychoanalytic therapy, as both analogue and continuation of ego development. (The principle of the converse consequence is itself a schema, similar to that of the mechanism of undoing. Whether the schema originates from the formally similar schema of Newton's third law is beyond present scope. Certainly interpersonal schemas are not the first ones apprehended.)
The experiences that give rise to structures seem to be just those that become unconscious. According to the principle of the dynamic unconscious, however, it must be the other way round. What is unconscious is thereby rendered semipermanent, hence, by definition, becomes structural. Common sense requires a distinction between symptoms, on the one hand, and the formation of ego and establishment of conscience, on the other; indeed, common sense may require a sharper distinction than therapy can sustain. To sustain the distinction between symptom and structure, theory, like therapy, must have recourse to the social matrix for which Erikson has been an eloquent spokesman. That lies outside the scope of the present essay, together with many other questions, such as how consciously remembered experiences can participate in formation of ego structure, as they surely do.
There appear to be other theories of ego development, the monistic ego psychologies and the currently received psychoanalytic version. The monistic ego theories state that ego development occurs because man strives for mastery, competence, or self-actualization. These theories come close to saying no more than that ego development does indeed occur. Certainly they state too little to be accounted substantial theories.
The received psychoanalytic version (Hartmann, 1939; Rapaport, 1960b) , by contrast, assumes too much. In the numerous variations of cathexis, neutralization, deneutralization, fusion, and defusion of drives, it postulates more entities and processes than require to be accounted for.
Thus the theory of ego development presented here, that interpersonal schemas become intrapersonal schemas, is not necessarily truer than the received psychoanalytic version or than the monistic ego psychologies, but it is much closer to qualifying technically as a scientific theory. It asserts something other than what can be observed more or less directly, but it does not postulate a set of entities more complex than the observations.
CONCLUSION
The three principles presented here have been characteristic of psychoanalytic thinking from its beginnings. The principle of the dynamic unconscious is presented clearly in Studies on Hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 189S) . The principle of the plasticity of the interpersonal drives is anticipated there in the stress on sexual etiology and on the repression of sexual impulses where they are incompatible with the patient's moral sensibility or other aspects of the ego. The emphasis on abreaction and catharsis anticipates the principle of the converse consequence. The paradigm of the plasticity of the interpersonal drives has survived radical changes in doctrine about what the fundamental drives or impulses are. Freud's reductionistic theory has covered the same span of time as his psychology, beginning with his 1895 "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (Freud, 19S4) . The question is raised whether the three psychological principles suffice to cover also those phenomena usually described in terms of cathectic energy.
Obviously, this essay cannot answer by reconstructing the whole history and scope of psychoanalytic psychology. The three principles constitute something akin to a system of differential equations. The macroscopic phenomena of normal development, of pathology, of therapy and recovery are due to the simultaneous operation of all three principles rather than being classifiable under one or the other. Thus in ordinary life none of the principles need be visible in pure form.
The vast literature of psychoanalysis is not replaced but supplemented by an attempt to discover the simplest, most economical set of principles that can account for the phenomena. The ground rules for evolving such a set of principles have been that they should be distinctively human and distinctively psychoanalytic, hence not reducible to biological or tension-reduction principles, and hence also saving the phenomena to be explained. That is, they should be concerned with meanings, as psychoanalytic therapy is. (There has been also a covert assumption that what is meaningful can be stated in ordinary language, without neologisms.) No system of ideas can be complete without indefinitely much dependence on the common domain. That a drive seeks gratification is such an idea from the common domain. Psychoanalysis must be consistent with biological observations but it need not account for them.
The psychology abstracted by these rules from the writings of Freud is a true and magnificently economical scientific theory. Psychoanalysts have tended to take this theory for granted in their work and have extolled as theory Freud's notions about cathectic energy. But the energic theory is enormously complex, made increasingly so as its inadequacies are increasingly seen, and it neither simplifies nor saves the observed phenomena. We have asked: Are any psychoanalytic principles necessary other than those of the dynamic unconscious, the plasticity of the interpersonal drives, and the converse consequence? The answer will take years of thoughtful consideration of diverse topics. Indeed, one might ask for a more careful examination of what extraanalytic principles are needed to make a rigorous system, were it not that systematization quickly becomes as dreary as the disease it aims to cure. What has been presented here is an audacious tour de force, too sketchy to be a model of mind. But it is not too simple to be a model of a theory of mind. The question can now be restated: Had it not been intertwined with Freud's psychology, to which it is irrelevant, would Freud's cathexis theory even have survived as a scientific theory?
